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RECENT DECISIONS
obtained while the juvenile was under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court to be later used in a criminal trial.
For the above mentioned reasons, the Arizona approach in
Maloney is to be preferred over that of the Minnesota court in
Loyd. When this question presents itself in other jurisdictions,
Maloney is the precedent which should be followed.27
GREGORY M. WEYANDT
Landlord and Tenant Law-The Implied Warranty of Habitability
in Residential Leases-The recent case of Green v. Sumskil arose
when landlord Jack Sumski, seeking possession of leased premises
and back rent, commenced an unlawful detainer action in the San
Francisco Small Claims Court. The tenant admitted nonpayment
of rent and defended the action on the ground that the landlord
failed to maintain the premises in a habitable condition. The small
claims court awarded the landlord possession of the premises and
entered a money judgment for back rent against the tenant. The
tenant appealed to the San Francisco Superior Court and a de
novo trial was held. The tenant submitted a copy of an inspection
report of the San Francisco Department of Public Works disclos-
ing about eighty housing code violations in the building as well as
an order of the department scheduling a condemnation hearing.
The tenant also submitted a detailed list of serious defects2 which
had not been repaired by the landlord after notice. The landlord
27. As yet, Wisconsin has not been faced with this problem. Wis. STAT. § 48.38(1)
(1971), states:
• . . The disposition of any child's case or any evidence given in the juvenile court
shall not be admissable as evidence against the child in any case or proceeding in
any other court ...
In Banas v. State, 34 Wis. 2d 468, 473, 149 N.W.2d 571, 574 (1966), the court stated:
• * . Under the prohibitions of sec. 48.38(1) the disposition of the child's case and
any evidence given in the juvenile court are not admissable as evidence against the
child in any case or proceeding in any other court.
This statement was made with reference to the refusal to allow a juvenile adjudication to
be used to impeach a juvenile witness. Whether it would apply in the same manner in a
Loyd fact situation and what is meant by "evidence given in the juvenile court" remains to
be seen.
1. Green v. Sumski, 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974).
2. The supreme court listed some of the more serious defects described by the tenant
including (I) the collapse and non-repair of the bathroom ceiling, (2) the continued presence
of rats, mice, and cock-roaches on the premises, (3) the lack of any heat in four of the
apartment's rooms, (4) plumbing blockages, (5) exposed and faulty wiring, and (6) an
illegally installed and dangerous stove. Id. at 621, 517 P.2d at 1170, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
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did not contest the presence of these defects. The Superior Court
found that California's "repair and deduct" statutes' constituted
the tenant's exclusive remedy and that such defects afforded the
tenant no defense in an unlawful detainer action. Judgment was
entered for the landlord awarding him possession and back rent.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of California that court
adopted an implied warranty of habitability in all residential
leases4 and held that the landlord's breach of this warranty may
be raised by a tenant as a defense in an unlawful detainer action.'
In addition, the court held that the statutory "repair and deduct"
provisions of the California Civil Code section 1941 etseq.6 did not
preclude this interpretation. The Supreme Court issued a peremp-
tory writ of mandate directing the San Francisco Superior Court
to vacate the judgment entered in this case and to proceed with the
trial of the unlawful detainer action in accordance with these
findings.
The modern trend of the courts to imply a warranty to habita-
bility in residential leases must be considered with reference to the
historical landlord-tenant doctrines. At common law the lease of
real property was regarded as a conveyance of an interest in land7
and as such the landlord-tenant relationship was governed by real
property law. Under the real property conveyance theory the prin-
3. The pertinent California "repair and deduct" statutes are as follows: CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1941 (West 1970).
The lessor of a building intended for the occupation of human beings must, in
the absence of an agreement to the contrary, put it into a condition fit for such
occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, which render it untenant-
able ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1971)
Repairs by lessee; rent deduction; limit. (a) If within a reasonable time after
notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so,
the lessee may repair the same himself, where the cost of such repairs . . . does not
require an expenditure greater than one month's rent of the premises, in which case
he shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other condi-
tions. This remedy shall not be available to the lessee more than once in any 12-
month period. (b) For the purposes of this section, if a lessee acts to repair and deduct
after the 30th day following notice, he is presumed to have acted after a reasonable
time. ...
See also CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941.1 (West Supp. 1971) which defines untenantable dwelling
and CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1971) which prohibits retaliatory eviction.
4. 10 Cal. 3d at 629, 517 P.2d at 1176, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712
5. Id. at 636, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
6. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1941 (West 1970); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1941.1, 1941.2, 1942,
1942.1, 1942.5 (West Supp. 1971).
7. See Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110, 118, 43 P.2d 788, 792, 101 A.L.R. 871, 877
(1935) and cases cited therein; Minnis v. Newbro-Gallogly Co., 174 Mich. 635, 639, 140
N.W. 980, 982 (1913).
[Vol. 58
RECENT DECISIONS
ciple of caveat emptor applied.' The tenant took the premises as
he found them and assumed all risks as to the condition of the
premises. The landlord made no warranties that the premises were
in a tenantable condition or adapted to the purpose for which they
were leased.' The general rule was that the landlord was not liable
either to a tenant or to others for defective conditions in the de-
mised premises whether the conditions existed at the time of the
lease or developed thereafter.' The caveat emptor doctrine applied
because the lessee was presumed to have inspected the premises
prior to occupancy. To alleviate the harsh effects of the caveat
emptor doctrine the courts developed several exceptions: The land-
lord could expressly covenant to put the premises in a tenantable
condition and maintain them." If the landlord knew of the defects
and such defects would not be disclosed to the lessee upon reasona-
ble inspection, the lessee would be justified in abandoning the
premises and be relieved from any further obligations under the
lease grounded upon the landlord's fraudulent concealment of the
defect.' 2 In the case of a furnished dwelling leased for a short
period of time, some courts have recognized an implied warranty
of habitability finding that the parties anticipate immediate occu-
pancy without alteration and that it is difficult to inspect a fur-
nished dwelling before renting. 3 Where the premises had not been
fully constructed at the time the lease was made so as to allow the
tenant an opportunity to inspect, the lessee was held not to be
bound by the lease. 4
The landlord had the primary obligation under the conveyanc-
ing theory to put the tenant in exclusive possession of the premises
and refrain from disturbing him.15 The tenant maintained complete
control of the premises to the exclusion of the landlord.' The right
8. 2 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, 233, 300 (Rohan ed. 1971).
9. Murray v. Albertson, 50 N.J.L. 167, 13 A. 394 (1888) and cases cited therein; Auer
v. Vahl, 129 Wis. 635, 109 N.W. 529 (1906).
10. Del Pino v. Gualtieri, 265 Cal. App. 2d 912, 919, 71 Cal. Rptr. 716, 721 (1968).
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W.2d 723
(1942).
12. Hinsdale v. McCune, 135 Iowa 682, 113 N.W. 478 (1907).
13. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961). In Lemle v. Breeden, 51
Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470, 40 A.L.R. 3d 637 (1969), the court pointed out that this exception
is artificial and the general rule of caveat emptor must be re-examined.
14. J.D. Young Corp. v. McClintic, 26 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
15. See Quinn and Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant.: A Critical Evaluation of the
Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REV. 225, (1969) (Hereinafter cited
as Quinn & Phillips).
16. Id. at 228.
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of entry and control of the premises were denied to the landlord,
and it followed that he was not held responsible for defects arising
after the tenant was in possession . 7 The landlord was, therefore,
under no duty to enter the land to make repairs unless such duty
was expressly imposed by the lease. 8 The tenant's primary obliga-
tion under the conveyancing theory was to pay rent in considera-
tion for the legal right to possession and use of the premises undis-
turbed by the landlord. 9
While the courts viewed the lease between the landlord and
tenant as a conveyance the contract concepts of mutually depen-
dent covenants had little effect on the landlord-tenant relationship.
The landlord's covenant to put the tenant in possession and quiet
enjoyment of the premises and the tenant's promise to pay rent
were held to be mutually independent unless the lease agreement
expressly declared the covenants to be dependent. Accordingly,
nonperformance of the lessor's obligations was held not to affect
the lessee's duty to pay rent.21 When the landlord actually evicted
the tenant from the premises, the covenant of quiet enjoyment was
breached and the tenant was relieved of the obligation to pay rent.2 1
In the cases where the landlord substantially interfered with the
tenant's use of the premises but did not actually evict the tenant,
the courts developed the doctrine of constructive eviction whereby
the tenant could rescind the lease and cease paying rent. Construc-
tive eviction was justified only where the acts or omissions of the
landlord substantially interfered with the lessee's beneficial use and
enjoyment of the property and the tenant actually vacated the
premises.2 2 The lease would be rescinded and the rent obligation
terminated as of the date of abandonment. 23 If the tenant re-
mained in possession, full rent remained due.
As society has become more urbanized, the frame of reference
in which the old conveyancing theories of property law operated
17. See Wannamacher v. Baldauf Corp., 262 Wis. 523, 55 N.W.2d 895 (1953).
18. See, e.g., Johnson v. Prange-Geussenhainer Co., 240 Wis. 363, 2 N.W.2d 723
(1942).
19. Automobile Supply Co. v. Scene-in-Action Corp., 340 Il. 196, 200-201, 172 N.E.
35, 37 (1930) and cases cited therein.
20. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 15, at 234.
21. Quinn & Phillips, supra note 15, at 229 n. 5 and 6.
22. Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255, 45 A.L.R. 1119 (1926); Bruckner
v. Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790 (1929); Schaaf v. Nortman, 19 Wis. 2d 540, 120
N.W.2d 654 (1963).
23. Bruckner v. Helfaer, 197 Wis. 582, 222 N.W. 790 (1929); Schaaf v. Nortman, 19
Wis. 2d 540, 120 N.W.2d 654 (1963).
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has changed. Modern apartment dwellers are no longer concerned
with long-term leases of farmland. In Javins v. First Nat'l Realty
Corp.,24 Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright premised his discussion of
the need for change in the landlord-tenant laws on the fact that the
land is no longer what the urban tenant bargains for. The value of
the lease to the modern apartment dweller is that it gives him a
place to live.
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek 'shel-
ter' today, they seek a well-known package of goods and serv-
ices-a package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but
also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing
facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and pro-
per maintenance.25
Along with the recognition that the common-law conveyancing
doctrines governing landlord-tenant relationships are incompatible
with contemporary social conditions, some courts have begun to
treat the lease as a contractual agreement rather than as a convey-
ance of land.2 1 In applying contract principles to the lease situation
some courts have held that the covenants in the lease are mutually
dependent such that any substantial failure of the landlord to meet
his obligations under the lease constitutes a failure of consideration
and would defeat his action for rent as well as entitle the tenant to
rescind the lease and abandon the premises.27 Courts have also
invoked the illegal contract theory to declare void leases in which
the parties knowingly made a rental agreement in violation of local
and state housing laws.28
The implication of a warranty of habitability in residential
leases illustrates a modern trend in the area of landlord-tenant
relationships. "Any realistic analysis of the lessor-lessee relation-
ship leads to the conclusion that the tenant's promise to pay rent
is in exchange for the landlord's promise to provide a livable dwell-
ing." 2  Thus, in those cases where the lease does not expressly
24. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 1074.
26. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1075; Brown v. Southall Realty
Corp., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470,
40 A.L.R.3d 637 (1969); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
27. Reste Realty v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). This court allowed the
tenant the election either of remaining in possession and paying a reduced rental rate or
abandoning the premises.
28. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834, 836 (D.C. App. 1968); Shephard v.
Lerner, 182 Cal. App. 2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960).
29. Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
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require the landlord to provide habitable premises in exchange for
rent, or where the landlord undertakes no obligation to maintain
or repair, courts have begun to imply warranties of fitness and
habitability. 3 The Javins court set out three basic reasons to ex-
plain why that court was compelled to imply the warranty of habit-
ability into residential leases. First, this warranty reflects the needs
of the modern urban tenant who usually does not have the mechan-
ical or financial ability to maintain the premises in a habitable
condition 3t (or, indeed, even the right to do so).31 Second, society
has come to realize that the consumer is in need of protection.3
The superior bargaining position of the landlord, his knowledge of
any defects on the premises and the standardization of leasing
contracts must be considered. Third, the implication would effec-
tuate legislative-policy to eliminate the social problems caused by
inadequate and dilapidated housing.35
30. The jurisdictions having adopted the implied warranty of habitability in addition to
those cited elsewhere in this article are Colorado in Quesenbury v. Patrick, CCH Pov. L.
REP. [transfer binder "New Develophments 1972-1974"] 91 15,803 (Colo. County Ct. March,
1972); Kansas in Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304 (1974); Louisiana in Reed
v. Classified Parking System, 232 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 1970); Michigan in Rome v.
Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d 850 (1972); Missouri in King v. Moorehead, 495
S.W.2d 65 (Mo. App. 1973); New Hampshire in Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d
248 (1971); New York in Morbeth Realty Corp. v. Rosenshine, 67 Misc. 2d 325, 323
N.Y.S.2d 363 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Ohio in Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919 (Ohio Mun. Ct.
1972). MINN. STAT. § 504.18, sub. I (L. 1971, Ch. 219 § 1, subd. 17) reads:
In every lease or license of residential premises, whether in writing or parol, the
lessor or licensor covenants: (a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for
the use intended by the parties; (b) to keep the premises in reasonable repair during
the term of the lease or license, except when the disrepair has been caused by the
wilful, malicious or irresponsible conduct of the lessee or licensee or a person under
his direction or control; (c) to maintain the premises in compliance with the applica-
ble health and safety laws of the state and of the local units of government where
the premises are located during the term of the lease or license.
31. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1077.
32. The tenant may not have the right to repair in that doing so may involve
entering areas outside the leasehold and tampering with another man's boiler." Quinn &
Phillips, supra note 15, at 232.
33. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1077.
34. Id. at 1079.
35. Id. at 1077. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590,
595-596, II1 N.W.2d 409, 412-413 (1961) stated:
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safe-place statute, building
codes, and health regulations, all impose certain duties on the property owner with
respect to the conditions of his premises. Thus, the legislature has made a policy
judgment-that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a
property owner. . . .To follow the old rule of no implied warranty of habitability
in leases would ...be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning
housing standards.
WIs. STAT. § 66.43(2), the Blighted Area Law, states:
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An important question that must be answered before the doc-
trine of implied warranty of habitability can be invoked is by what
standard should habitability be measured? The Green decision
points out that during the past half century comprehensive housing
codes have been enacted throughout the country. 6 These codes
affirm that under contemporary conditions public policy compels
landlords to bear the primary responsibility for maintaining clean,
safe and habitable housing in the state of California. 3 The habita-
bility standard recognized by California establishes that residential
living quarters "will be maintained in a habitable state for the
duration of the lease. '38 The landlord is not required to ensure
that the premises are perfect, but the warranty does require that
"bare living requirements be maintained."39 "In most cases, sub-
stantial compliance with those applicable building and housing
code standards will suffice to meet the landlord obligations under
the common law implied warranty of habitability we now recog-
nize."40
The Javins court held that the old no-duty-to-repair rule cannot
co-exist with the obligations imposed on the landlord by the typical
modern housing code and in the District of Columbia, the stan-
dards of the habitability warranty are set out in the housing regula-
tions and are implied by operation of the law into leases of urban
dwelling units covered by these regulations.4
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Posnanski v. Hood,42 how-
ever, has determined that neither the legislature nor the common
council of Milwaukee intended that the housing code be an implied
covenant in a lease mutually dependent with the tenant's covenant
to pay rent. The Wisconsin court thereby refused to sanction rent
withholding as a means of enforcing the housing code. The court
found that to hold that the housing code is implied in a lease would
It is hereby found and declared that there have existed and continue to exist in
cities within the state, substandard, unsanitary, deteriorated, slum and blighted areas
which constitute a serious and growing menace, injurious and inimical to the public
health, safety, morals and welfare of the residents of the state ....
36. 10 Cal. 3d at 628, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704.
37. Id. at 628, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711.
38. Id. at 638, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
39. Id. at 638, 517 P.2d at 1182, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
40. Id. at 638, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
41. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1076-77 (1970).
42. 46 Wis. 2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970). In this decision the Wisconsin court cites
Saunders v. First National Realty Corp., 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. App. 1968) which held that
the implied warranty of habitability is not measured by the standard of the housing code.
Saunders was reversed in Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (1970).
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circumvent the existing housing code enforcement procedures.43 In
addition, the court reasoned that the Milwaukee ordinances con-
tain general terms such as "reasonably good state of repair" which
leave a great deal of discretion to those enforcing the code." Fur-
ther, there are no standards for differentiating between consequen-
tial and inconsequential violations set out in'the codes.4" Thus, the
court found the common council indicated an intent that the hous-
ing code be enforced administratively and judicial definition should
not supplant administrative regulation."
Factors to determine whether an implied warranty of habitabil-
ity has been breached, in addition to violations of housing laws,
regulations or ordinances were set out in Mease v. Fox.47 They
include: (1) the nature of deficiency or defect; (2) its effect on safety
and sanitation; (3) the length of time for which it persisted; (4) the
age of the structure; (5) the amount of the rent; (6) whether the
tenant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived the defects,
or is estopped to raise the question of breach; (7) whether the
defects or deficiencies resulted from unusual, abnormal or mali-
cious use by the tenant."
The Green court held that breach of the implied warranty of
habitability may be used as a defense in an unlawful detainer ac-
tion. An unlawful detainer action is a statutory action initiated by
the landlord to recover leased premises because of nonpayment of
rent. 9 The landlord shows that the tenant is in possession under a
lease and failed to pay the stipulated rent.50 The California statute
provides for an action of unlawful detainer as a summary proceed-
ing.5t However, the Green court found that nothing in the statutory
provisions governing unlawful detainer proceedings prohibits the
43. Posnanski v. Hood, 46 Wis. 2d at 182, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
44. Id. at 181, 174 N.W.2d at 532.
45. Id. at 181, 174 N.W.2d at 533.
46. Id. at 182, 174 N.W.2d at 533. WIs. STAT. § 704.07 (1969) Committee Comment
40E W.S.A. ch. 551-818 at page 651:
• . . In the absence of a statute the landlord has no duty to keep leased premises
in repair, and the tenant has a limited duty to make what are called "tenantable"
repairs as necessary to prevent waste. Most leases today contain some kind of
provision regarding repairs. Many informal tenancies, however, operate under the
common law rule. The purpose of this section is to allocate a duty of repair between
the landlord and the tenant in a fair manner . . ..
47. 200 N.W.2d 791 (Iowa 1972).
48. Id. at 797.
49. See Leifman v. Percansky, 186 Minn. 427, 429, 243 N.W. 446, 447 (1932).
50. Id. at 429, 243 N.W. at 447.
51. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 1174 (1971).
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assertion of any defense. 2 The tenant is not prohibited from inter-
posing a defense which directly relates to the issue of possession
such that the tenant would remain in possession of the premises if
the defense prevails. 3 Extraneous matters not directly dealing
with the issue of possession are precluded from introduction in the
unlawful detainer action."
The finding in the Green case was that the landlord's breach
of implied warranty of habitability is directly relevant to the issue
of possession.5 In arriving at this holding the court reasoned that
the tenant's duty to pay rent is mutually dependent on the land-
lord's fulfillment of his implied warranty of habitability." Where
the tenant proves this warranty was breached and therefore his
nonpayment of rent was justified, the landlord would not be enti-
tled to possession of the premises because no rent would be due.
In addition the court stated that the habitability defense would not
frustrate the summary nature of the unlawful detainer action.
The availability of the habitability defense in summary actions
for possession has been established' recently in several jurisdic-
tions.58 The decision of the court in Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown" sustained the defense of the tenant in a summary dispos-
session action for nonpayment of rent when the tenant withheld
rent and alleged that the landlord had breached the implied war-
ranty. In Marini v. Ireland"0 the court permitted the tenant to
defend a summary dispossession action for nonpayment of rent
where the tenant withheld rent and made repairs alleging that she
had offset the cost of those repairs against a portion of the rent.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has held that breach of a statu-
tory covenant of habitability implied in leases of residential prem-
ises may be asserted as a defense in an unlawful detainer action
for nonpayment of rent." In its decision, the Minnesota court
52. 10 Cal.3d at 633, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
53. Id. at 634, 517 P.2d at 1179, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
54. Id. at 634, 517 P.2d at 1179, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
55. Id. at 635, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
56. Id. at 636, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
57. Id. at 637, 517 P.2d at 1181, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
58. Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Academy
Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 261 A.2d 413 (1970); Academy Spires v. Brown,
Ill N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970); Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526,
40 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970); Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash. 2d 22, 515 P.2d 160 (1973).
59. 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
60. 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526, 40 A.L.R.3d 1356 (1970).
61. Fritz v. Warthen, - Minn. _, 213 N.W.2d 339 (1973). In this decision the
court found abandonment of the premises to be a prerequisite to the assertion of construc-
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concluded that the covenant of habitability is mutual with the
covenant to pay rent and the rent, or at least part of it, is not due
under the terms of the lease when the landlord has breached the
statutory covenants.
In Wisconsin, the specific question as to whether a tenant may
assert the defense of breach of implied warranty of habitability in
a summary proceeding has not been decided.12 Wisconsin Statutes
section 704.07, in absence of a contrary provision in a lease, deline-
ates the duties of the landlord and the tenant to maintain and
repair the leased premises. This section does not provide the tenant
with a means of enforcement.
Wisconsin Statutes section 704.17 sets out the notice require-
ments necessary for a landlord to terminate tenancies for failure
to pay rent or other breach by the tenant. Where the tenant fails
to pay rent when due and the landlord has given the statutory
notice the landlord may, pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section
710.10, remove the tenant under Wisconsin Statutes chapter 299
or 813.
The new eviction procedure set out in Wisconsin Statutes
section 299.4063 as incorporated in the Small Claims Act, is a
departure from the old unlawful detainer procedure of Wisconsin
Statutes, chapter 291.4 Wisconsin Statutes section 299.40 provides
tive or partial constructive eviction as a defense in an unlawful detainer action for nonpay-
ment of rent, setting out the following at page 343:
We are aware that pending final determination of the tenant's claim of breach
of the statutory covenants, the landlord will be deprived of all or a portion of the
rent while the tenant remains in possession. However, during the period the landlord
will continue to experience normal operating and overhead expenses. In a building
where all or a substantial number of tenants withhold their rent, this could be
devastating to a landlord. Because he is deprived of rental income, he may be unable
to correct the very conditions that the tenant contends render the premises untenant-
able.
62. In the case of Malick v. Kellogg, 118 Wis. 405, 95 N.W. 372 (1903), the landlord
brought an unlawful entry and detainer action for nonpayment of rent. The tenant defended
on the ground that the landlord failed to perform certain agreements or conditions after
the tenant took possession and alleged that payment of rent was therefore excused. The
court held that such an agreement is not a defense to an action for unlawful detainer for
non-payment of rent. The court reasoned that the landlord did not fail to put the tenant in
possession nor did he evict the tenant from any part of the premises. In the case of Dickhut
v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970), the landlord brought an unlawful
detainer action pursuant to Wisconsin Statute section 291.11. The court permitted the
assertion, as a valid defense, the tenant's allegation that the landlord's attempt to terminate
the tenancy and evict the tenant was motivated as retaliation for the tenant's complaint to
the health authorities of a housing code sanitary violation.
63. Wis. STAT. § 299.40 as created by Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 284 § 24, eff. July 1, 1971.
64. Chapter 291, Wis. STAT. as it existed after the partial repeal by Wis. Laws 1969,
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that an eviction action may be commenced by the person entitled
to possession of the property to remove any person who is not
entitled either to possession or occupancy of that property. It is the
policy of the Small Claims Act to provide as summary a procedure
as possible. Section 299.43, however, authorizes the defendant in
an eviction proceeding, within the limitation of section 299.02, to
counterclaim provided that the claim related to the rented property
shall be considered as arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim. Whether the
tenant may assert by way of counterclaim that the landlord
breached the implied warranty of habitability is not determined.
Despite the fact that the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v.
Perssion5 afforded the tenant relief under the implied warranty of
habitability theory, it seems, in light of Posnanski and the above
noted statutes, that a tenant who withholds rent in an attempt to
force a landlord to repair and maintain the leased premises puts
himself in the position of possibly being evicted. In addition to the
eviction remedy the landlord may look to sections 704.23, 704.27
or 704.29 for recovery of damages suffered. The landlord may also
elect to remove the tenant under the newly created Wisconsin Stat-
utes chapter 81366 effective July 1, 1974, which provides under
section 813.01 that a person claiming an interest in real property
and the right to possession of that property may bring an action
for possession. Under section 813.02 the plaintiff may demand
damages. Under section 813.15 a person who withholds possession
of the land from the person adjudged to be entitled to the land may
be punished for contempt.
California Civil Code sections 1941 through 1942.1, in effect,
authorize a tenant, after giving reasonable notice of dilapidations
to the landlord, either to vacate the premises without further liabil-
ity for rent or to make the repairs and deduct the cost of such
repairs-if not greater than one month's rent-from his rent. The
tenant may utilize the "repair and deduct" option no more than
once in any twelve-month period. The Green court held that this
statutory repair and deduct remedy was not designed as an exclu-
sive remedy for tenants requiring maintenance and repair of the
leased premises. 7 In arriving at this conclusion, the court points
ch. 87 was repealed by Wis. Laws 1969, ch. 284, § 7, effective July 1, 1971. See also, Boden,
1971 Revision of Eviction Practice in Wisconsin, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 298 (1971).
65. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
66. Laws of 1973, ch. 189 § 16, effective July 1, 1974.
67. 10 Cal. 3d at 630, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 712.
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out that the scope of the statute is limited in that the legislature
framed the section only to encompass relatively minor dilapida-
tions in leased premises. The Green court determined that the
statutory remedies have been viewed as additional to and compli-
mentary of the tenant's common law rights. Thus, the implication
of the warranty of habitability is not precluded by the statutory
remedy. 8
The Green court instructed the trial court to determine whether
the tenant's allegations of a breach of implied warranty were sub-
stantiated and, if so, then to determine the extent of the damages
flowing from this breach. 9 The court recognized that the ascertain-
ment of appropriate damages cannot be computed with complete
certainty but the ". . . trial courts must do the best they can and
use all available facts to approximate the fair and reasonable dam-
ages under all of the circumstances. '70
A major advantage to the tenant in the implication of warran-
ties of habitability into the lease contract is the number of remedies
available upon breach of the warranty in addition to the construc-
tive eviction remedy .7  Under the implied warranty theory, the
tenant has available the contractual remedies of damages, rescis-
sion or reformation of the lease, without the necessity of abandon-
ing the premises7 2 The scarcity of adequate housing accommoda-
tions73 means that the historic constructive eviction remedy is of
68. Id. at 631, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
69. Id. at 639, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
70. Id. at 640, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
71. For example, in Schaaf v. Nortman, 19 Wis. 2d 540, 120 N.W.2d 654 (1963) the
court held that the landlord was entitled to unpaid rent where the tenant claimed deficiencies
in the apartment and entitlement to constructive eviction. The Wisconsin court citing 32
Am. JUR. Landlord and Tenant § 246 (1948) applied the following general principles:
i * * It is now well established that any disturbance of the tenants' possession by
the landlord, or someone acting under his authority, which renders the premises unfit
for occupancy for the purposes for which they were demised or which deprives the
tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises, causing him to abandon them,
amounts to a constructive eviction, provided the tenant abandons the premises within
a reasonable time. 19 Wis. 2d at 543, 120 N.W.2d at 656.
72. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 436, 462 P.2d 470, 475, 40 A.L.R.3d 637, 645
(1969).
73. The report of the NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968)
at page 257 points out that during the decade of the 1960's the trend of the country as a
whole was toward less substantial housing particularly in the cities where the situation
continues to deteriorate. At page 259 the Commission states:
Thousands of landlords in disadvantaged neighborhoods openly violate building
codes with impunity ... Yet in most cities, few building code violations ... are
ever corrected, even when tenants complain directly to municipal building depart-
ments. There are economic reasons why these codes are not rigorously enforced.
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little solace to a lessee who may be unable to find another dwelling
of any kind. The Wisconsin Court in Pines74 implied a warranty
of habitability in the lease of a furnished house, disregarding the
constructive eviction doctrine, holding that the tenants were ab-
solved from any liability for rent under the lease and their only
liability was for the reasonable rental value of the premises during
the time of actual occupancy. Among the jurisdictions recognizing
the implied warranty of habitability in leased residential property
recent decisions have indicated that where breach of the warranty
is established, the "tenant's damages shall be measured by the
difference between the fair rental value of the premises if they had
been as warranted and the fair rental value of the premises as they
were during occupancy by the tenant in the unsafe or unsanitary
conditon." 75
Although courts and legislatures have recognized that the needs
of the modern, urban tenant differ radically from his agrarian
predecessor, the old landlord-tenant conveyance principles con-
tinue to play a role in judicial construction of leases for residential
premises. The trend, however, is now toward judicial and legisla-
tive abrogation of the antiquated common law doctrines.
As the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability develops,
courts and legislators have encountered and solved some of the
problems involved in recognition of a new legal doctrine. In Jack
Spring, Inc. v. Little,76 the Illinois court considered the argument
that any change in the long established rules of landlord and tenant
law should be effected by the legislature. The court admitted that
the rules are a product of judicial decision, and the court has a duty
to change the law when circumstances so require.
One problem in the application of the implied warranty of
habitability that the Green court and other courts have attempted
to solve is defining the scope of the warranty. The question in
essence is to what extent should the landlord be held to impliedly
Bringing many old structures up to code standards and maintaining them at that level
would often require owners to raise rents far above the ability of local residents to
pay. In New York City, rigorous code enforcement has already caused owners to
board up and abandon over 2,500 buildings rather than incur the expense of repairing
them.
74. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 597, I11 N.W.2d 409, 413 (1961).
75. 10 Cal. 3d at 638, 517 P.2d at 1183, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 719 citing, Mease v. Fox,
200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Academy Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395,
261 A.2d 413, 417 (1970); Boston Housing Authority v. Hemmingway, 293 N.E.2d 831,
845 (Mass. 1973).
76. 50 111. 2d 351, 366-367, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217 (1972).
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warrant that the premises are habitable? The Green court found
that "bare living requirements must be maintained" which, in most
cases, means substantial compliance with applicable building and
housing code standards. The Posnanski court refused to imply that
the housing codes of Milwaukee are incorporated into the lease of
residential premises. The New Jersey court in Samuelson v.
Quinones"7 perhaps extended the public policy reasoning behind the
Posnanski decision and set out a possible handicap to the develop-
ment of the implied warranty doctrine when the court stated:
We take judicial notice of the fact that there is an acute
shortage of low-income housing in the City of Newark, and that
such housing which exists is frequently not in full compliance
with the city's housing ordinances and building codes. We must
also recognize the hard practical facts of life that if the landlords,
under existing conditions, were to be deprived of all rents because
of noncompliance with such ordinances and building codes, there
would be far fewer available low income housing units-land-
lords would either abandon their properties, or if they spent the
money needed to comply with the ordinances and codes, the
amount of rent they would have to charge would price low in-
come tenants out of the market. The problem seems to be almost
insoluble. [sic]. 8
The doctrine of implied warranty of habitability and fitness in
residential leases appears to be a progressive dual function doc-
trine: first, it provides optional remedies to the tenant where the
demised premises are unfit for habitability, and secondly, it serves
to pressure landlords into maintaining the premises they lease.
Where the tenant is able to invoke the implied warranty reme-
dies-paying only the reasonable value of the premises while they
are in the uninhabitable condition, withholding rent and making
repairs, or withholding rent to force the landlord to make re-
pairs-the courts and legislatures must also weigh the economic
impact of this theory on the landlord. The landlord may find the
only economic options feasible are to abandon the property or to
raise rent to cover the cost of repairs. The tenant's housing situa-
tion would, therefore, be little aided by the implied warranty of
habitability doctrine.
BARBARA MAIER
77. 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (1972).
78. Id. at _ 291 A.2d at 583.
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